Synonyms for coherentism or Related words with coherentism
Examples of "coherentism"
is the belief that an idea is justified if and only if it is part of a coherent system of mutually supporting beliefs (i.e., beliefs that support each other). In effect
denies that justification can only take the form of a chain.
replaces the chain with a holistic web.
(consistency) among "all" beliefs, both self-standing and derived ones. This approach is related to
His approach is distinct from foundationalism, empiricist or otherwise, as well as from
, by the following three dimensions:
Of the main responses,
and skepticism are clearly consistent with evidentialism.
allows evidential support for all of our justified beliefs in the face of the regress argument by allowing for circular chains of evidential support among beliefs. And the skeptic here is utilizing an evidentialist demand to arrive at her skeptical conclusion.
Haack argues that foundationalism and
don't exhaust the field, and that an intermediate theory is more plausible than either. It is possible to include the relevance of experience for the justification of empirical beliefs, as experientialist foundationalism does but
does not, and at the same time, instead of requiring a privileged class of basic beliefs, to allow for pervasive mutual dependence among beliefs, as
does but foundationalism does not. These are the key ideas of foundherentism. Precursors of Haack's view include Bertrand Russell's epistemology, in which both empirical foundations and coherence are components of justification.
was primarily outlined by Harold Henry Joachim in his book "The Nature of Truth" (1906). More recently, several contemporary epistemologists have significantly contributed to and defended the theory; primarily Laurence BonJour and Keith Lehrer.
Based on his critique of three modes of argument and different from either foundationalism or
, Peirce's approach seeks to justify claims by a three-phase dynamic of inquiry:
is sometimes characterized as accepting that the series forms a loop, but although this would produce a form of
, this is not what is generally meant by the term. Those who do accept the loop theory sometimes argue that the body of assumptions used to prove the theory is not what is at question in considering a loop of premises. This would serve the typical purpose of circumventing the reliance on a regression, but might be considered a form of logical foundationalism. But otherwise, it must be assumed that a loop begs the question, meaning that it does not provide sufficient logic to constitute proof.
has to face is the "plurality objection". There is nothing within the definition of coherence which makes it impossible for two entirely different sets of beliefs to be internally coherent. Thus there might be several such sets. But if one supposes—in line with the principle of non-contradiction—that there can only be "one" complete set of truths,
must therefore resolve internally that these systems are not contradictory, by establishing what is meant by truth. At this point, Coherence could be faulted for adopting its own variation of dogmatic foundationalism by arbitrarily selecting truth values. Coherentists must argue that their truth-values are not arbitrary for provable reasons.
is the name given to a few philosophical theories in modern epistemology. There are two distinct types of
. One is the coherence theory of truth; the other, the coherence theory of justification. Coherent truth is divided between an anthropological approach, which applies only to localized networks ('true within a given sample of a population, given our understanding of the population'), and an approach that is judged on the basis of universals, such as categorical sets. The anthropological approach belongs more properly to the correspondence theory of truth, while the universal theories are a small development within analytic philosophy. The coherentist theory of justification, which may be interpreted as relating to either theory of coherent truth, characterizes epistemic justification as a property of a belief only if that belief is a member of a coherent set. What distinguishes
from other theories of justification is that the set is the primary bearer of justification. As an epistemological theory,
opposes dogmatic foundationalism and also infinitism through its insistence on definitions. It also attempts to offer a solution to the regress argument that plagues correspondence theory. In an epistemological sense, it is a theory about how belief can be proof-theoretically justified.
The most common objection to naïve
is that it relies on the idea that circular justification is acceptable. In this view, P ultimately supports P, begging the question. Coherentists reply that it is not just P that is supporting P, but P along with the totality of the other statements in the whole system of belief.
Adherents of the epistemological theory of
typically claim that as a necessary condition of the justification of a belief, that belief must form a part of a logically non-contradictory system of beliefs. Some dialetheists, including Graham Priest, have argued that coherence may not require consistency.
However, some epistemologists still consider knowledge to have a justification condition. Traditional theories of justification (foundationalism and
) and indeed some philosophers consider an infinite regress not to be a valid justification. In their view, if "A" is justified by "B", "B" by "C", and so forth, then either
In epistemology, foundherentism is a theory of justification that combines elements from the two rival theories addressing infinite regress, foundationalism prone to arbitrariness, and
prone to circularity (problems raised by the Münchhausen trilemma). Foundherentism was developed and defended by Susan Haack in "Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology" (1993).
Alternatively, the chain of reasoning may loop around on itself, forming a circle. In this case, the justification of any statement is used, perhaps after a long chain of reasoning, in justifying itself, and the argument is circular. This is a version of
This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of
. In this case, commonsense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny.
denies the soundness of the regression argument. The regression argument makes the assumption that the justification for a proposition takes the form of another proposition: P" justifies P', which in turn justifies P. For
, justification is a holistic process. Inferential justification for the belief that P is nonlinear. This means that P" and P' are not epistemically prior to P. Rather, the beliefs that P", P', and P work together to achieve epistemic justification. Catherine Elgin has expressed the same point differently, arguing that beliefs must be "mutually consistent, cotenable, and supportive. That is, the components must be reasonable in light of one another. Since both cotenability and supportiveness are matters of degree, coherence is too." Usually the system of belief is taken to be the complete set of beliefs of the individual or group, that is, their theory of the world.
is a view about the structure and system of knowledge, or else justified belief. The coherentist's thesis is normally formulated in terms of a denial of its contrary, such as dogmatic foundationalism, which lacks a proof-theoretical framework, or correspondence theory, which lacks universalism. Counterfactualism, through a vocabulary developed by David K. Lewis and his Many worlds theory although popular with philosophers, has had the effect of creating wide disbelief of universals amongst academics. Many difficulties lie in between hypothetical coherence and its effective actualization.
claims, at a minimum, that not all knowledge "AND" justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge "OR" justified belief. To defend this view, they may argue that conjunctions (AND) are more specific, and thus in some way more defensible, than disjunctions (OR).
A position known as "foundherentism", advanced by Susan Haack, is meant to be a unification of foundationalism and
. One component of this theory is what is called the "analogy of the crossword puzzle." Whereas, for example, infinitists regard the regress of reasons as "shaped" like a single line, Susan Haack has argued that it is more like a crossword puzzle, with multiple lines mutually supporting each other.
Foundationalism concerns philosophical theories of knowledge resting upon justified belief, or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises. Its main rival is
, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.
Copyright © 2017