Synonyms for collateral_estoppel or Related words with collateral_estoppel

res_judicata              estoppel              patent_misuse              contributory_infringement              injunctive_relief              declaratory_judgment              forum_non_conveniens              res_ipsa_loquitur              promissory_estoppel              rescission              counterclaim              vicarious_liability              joinder              demurrer              declaratory_relief              laches              affirmative_defenses              antitrust_laws              sovereign_immunity              counterclaims              stare_decisis              nonintercourse_act              frivolous_litigation              declaratory_judgments              justiciability              qui_tam              strict_liability              appellee              respondeat_superior              exhaustion_doctrine              subrogation              unjust_enrichment              mootness              contributory_negligence              privity              equitable_tolling              retroactivity              preclusion              trover              rei_vindicatio              enforceability              apprendi              alien_tort_statute              hedley_byrne              proprietary_estoppel              assumpsit              malicious_prosecution              assignor              trademark_dilution              issue_preclusion             

Examples of "collateral_estoppel"
Traditionally, collateral estoppel applied only where there was mutuality of parties, meaning that both the party seeking to employ collateral estoppel and the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought were parties to the prior action.
Collateral estoppel may be used either defensively or offensively; mutually or non-mutually:
In the absence of mutuality, courts are more hesitant to apply collateral estoppel in an offensive setting than in a defensive one. In other words, courts are more hesitant to apply collateral estoppel to a defendant from a previous action if the defendant is sued by a new plaintiff for the same issue.
With John M. Bibona. "Collateral Estoppel as a Basis for Attorney Discipline: The Next Step," "Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics" 5, no. 1 (1991): 1-33.WorldCat permalink.
In the U.S., the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel does not extend to the U.S. government; it is limited to private litigants.
More specifically, as stated in "Ashe v. Swenson", 397 U.S. 436 (1970): "...when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." "Res judicata" is a term of general application. Underneath that conceptual umbrella is the concept of collateral estoppel. As applied to double jeopardy, the court will use collateral "estoppel" as its basis for forming an opinion.
"Res judicata" includes two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel or issue estoppel), though sometimes "res judicata" is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion.
Collateral estoppel cases raise constitutional due process problems, particularly when it is applied to a party that did not participate in the original suit. Due process mandates that collateral estoppel not be applied to a party that has not litigated the issue in dispute, unless that party is in legal privity to a party that litigated it. In other words, every disputant is entitled to a day in court and cannot ordinarily be bound by the negative result of another disputant's suit, even if that other disputant had exactly the same legal and factual arguments.
Collateral estoppel does not prevent an appeal of a decision, or a party from asking the judge for re-argument or a revised decision. In federal court, judgments on appeal are given preclusive effect. However, if the decision is vacated, the preclusive effect of the judgment fails.
Collateral estoppel is an efficiency rule that is meant to save judicial resources by avoiding the relitigation of issues of fact that have already been litigated. The rule is also intended to protect defendants from the inequity of having to defend the same issue repeatedly.
On March 23, 2006, Judge Lew concluded that, in the 1947-48 lawsuit (see above), Judge Young already addressed and rejected these arguments and that "res judicata" and collateral estoppel precluded re-litigation. Lew ruled that the Siegel heirs had effectively terminated Siegel's grant of the rights to Superboy. He also ruled that the protagonist of the television show "Smallville" was Superboy.
However, the Supreme Court said that collateral estoppel in determinations of tax liability "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged."
Collateral estoppel is closely related to the concept of claim preclusion, which prevents parties relitigating the same cause of action after it has been decided by a judge or jury. "Res judicata" (literally - that which has been decided) can be used as the term for both concepts, or purely as a synonym for claim preclusion. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.
Due process concerns also can arise even when a party did have a day in court to dispute an issue. For example, a defendant may have not effectively litigated an issue decided against the defendant in an earlier suit because the damages were too small, so it may be unjust to bar the defendant from relitigating the issue in a trial for much greater damages. As another example, suppose that a defendant did effectively litigate an issue to a favorable conclusion in nine cases, but to an unfavorable result in a tenth case. In this situation, note that the defendant did not have the opportunity to use the nine judgments in its favor as collateral estoppel against subsequent plaintiffs, because that would violate their right to a day in court. To allow a subsequent plaintiff to use the tenth, negative judgment as collateral estoppel against the defendant may seem unjust. See the leading USA Supreme Court case Parklane Hosiery Co, Inc. v. Shore.
The Third Circuit said that it found collateral estoppel inapplicable because the judgment in the "Government" was not dependent upon the determination that anticompetitive injury to the dealers such as the plaintiffs was essential to the prior determination that Dentsply had committed an antitrust violation. The "Government" case requests a determination whether Dentsply's conduct was anticompetitive. That had two issues: "first, whether Dentsply possessed monopoly power; and second, whether Dentsply used that power to edge out competition." The ruling made requires only a finding that Dentsply's manufacturer competitors was injured. There was no "need to conclude that any upstream purchasers, such as [plaintiff Hess was] threatened with injury." That might have happened, but that does not mean that it was essential to the holding. Therefore, there was no collateral estoppel and therefore, further, "Dentsply should not be precluded from defending itself against the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief." Aside from arguing collateral estoppel, the plaintiffs made no showing of antitrust injury. Furthermore, since the Government case resulted in an injunction that already prohibited Dentsply from pursuing the very conduct that gave rise to the Plaintiffs' claim, the plaintiffs did not need a duplicative injunction. The Third Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion.
Collateral estoppel may be avoided as a defense if the claimant did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided by a state court, which means he may file suit in federal court to challenge the adequacy of state procedures. Note that in this case the plaintiff's suit would be v. the state, not v. the other party in the prior suit.
But note that the use of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel may work "against" the goal of judicial economy. The offensive use encourages potential plaintiffs to sit and "test the waters" to see the strength of the defendant's case. If the defendant's case is weak, there is great incentive for new parties to sue and claim that the defendant is estopped based on the prior adverse ruling.
"Res judicata" may be used as a defense in a second suit which involves the same claim as a prior suit, and is conclusive on all matters which were litigated as well as all matters which could have been litigated in the prior suit. In "collateral estoppel" the judgment is conclusive only regarding the issues which were litigated. In order for CE to apply, four factors must be met:
The doctrine of direct estoppel prevents a party to a litigation from relitigating an issue that was decided against that party in that litigation, under certain circumstances. Specifically, direct estoppel applies where the issue was decided as part of a larger claim which was finally decided, and stops the issue from being redecided in another claim of the same lawsuit. Contrast collateral estoppel, which stops a claim from being redecided in "another" lawsuit.
The defendants contended that "the court invoked non-mutual collateral estoppel and precluded Polytech from presenting its permissible repair and first sale defenses on the basis of court proceedings to which Polytech was not a party." However, this argument was waived because it was not raised at the right time during the defendants' 50(a) motion for judgement as a matter of law and 50(b) post-trial motion.