Synonyms for conventionalism or Related words with conventionalism

intuitionism              nominalism              subjectivism              evolutionism              rationalism              nominalist              foundationalism              positivism              relativism              scientism              positivist              hegelian              empiricism              hegelianism              vitalism              materialist              supernaturalism              personalism              solipsism              holism              egoism              pragmatism              pantheism              essentialism              psychologism              expressivism              contextualism              cartesianism              panpsychism              relativist              cognitivism              eurocentrism              relativists              rationalistic              organicism              phenomenalism              interpretivism              materialists              habermas              fallibilism              materialism              kantian              formalist              atomism              constructivism              deism              deistic              existentialism              aristotelianism              herbart             



Examples of "conventionalism"
In this chapter, Dworkin begins his three part, 3-tier assessment of law with his criticism of Conventionalism. He differentiated Conventionalism as falling into two different kinds, which are insufficient, in the end, to the needs of contemporary jurisprudence at the end of the 20th century leading to the start of the 21st century. Dworkin ends the chapter asserting the failure of Conventionalism.
The debate on linguistic conventionalism goes back to Plato's "Cratylus" and the Mīmāṃsā philosophy of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
Malament's work focuses the conceptual foundations of the special and general theories of relativity. Regarding whether simultaneity in special relativity, the Einstein synchronisation is conventional, Malament argues against conventionalism and is regarded by some as having refuted Adolf Grünbaum's argument for conventionalism. Grünbaum, as well as Sahotra Sarkar and John Stachel, don't agree, whereas Robert Rynasiewicz sides with Malament.
Vincent Canby: "Adorable Acting, especially by Claude Jade, who brings the right mixture of conventionalism and self-interest into her role."
be traced arbitrarily has been described as conventionalism and more generally the acceptance of his conception has been seen to present a refined nominalism.
Carroll's dialogue is apparently the first description of an obstacle to conventionalism about logical truth, later reworked in more sober philosophical terms by W.V.O. Quine.
This view was developed and updated to include considerations from relativistic physics by Hans Reichenbach. Reichenbach's conventionalism, applying to space and time, focuses around the idea of coordinative definition.
Giedymin's standpoint was much influenced by his exposure to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's perception of the history of ideas which in defiance of traditional empiricism reviews the philosophy of science of the early 20th century in the light of pragmatic conventionalism.
In particular, Dworkin has characterized law as having the main function of restraining state's coercion. Nigel Simmonds has rejected Dworkin's disapproval of conventionalism, claiming that his characterization of law is too narrow.
"...my father's individualism and pagan ethical standards were in complete contrast to the rigidly moral conventionalism of my mother's teaching. This disequilibrium, which made my life a kind of endless disputation, is the main reason why I became an intellectual."
The idea of a sphere-world was constructed by Henri Poincaré who, while pursuing his argument for conventionalism (see philosophy of space and time), offered a thought experiment about a sphere with strange properties.
Conventionalism, as applied to legal philosophy is one of the three rival conceptions of law constructed by American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin in his work "Law's Empire". The other two conceptions of law are legal pragmatism and law as integrity.
Kohlberg's stages of moral development have been read as creating a hierarchy of increasing moral complexity, ranging from the premoral at the bottom, through the midrange of conventionalism, up to the apex of self-selected morality.
Karl Popper broadened the meaning of conventionalism still more. In "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", he defined a "conventionalist stratagem" as any technique that is used by a theorist to evade the consequences of a falsifying observation or experiment. Popper identified four such stratagems:
Conventionalism is the philosophical attitude that fundamental principles of a certain kind are grounded on (explicit or implicit) agreements in society, rather than on external reality. Although this attitude is commonly held with respect to the rules of grammar, its application to the propositions of ethics, law, science, mathematics, and logic is more controversial.
In this chapter, Dworkin tells his readers that there are three types of law with which he is primarily concerned. These three areas of law are outlined as (a) Conventionalism, (b) Pragmatism (semantic theory), and (c) Law as integrity. Dworkin shall make a primary point of defending Law as integrity throughout the subsequent chapters of his text.
Jane's only real dislikes are materialism, conventionalism and commercialism, all of which her personality overtly disowns as components of a society and as social expectations. Jane also has a dislike for mathematics. In the episode Anti-Social Climbers, it is revealed that Jane hates blue M&M's.
Hugo Dingler's critical voluntarism in the philosophy of science is a form of conventionalism, which posits that theorizing in the sciences starts with an unavoidable free decision of the will. The successor school of Dingler's critical voluntarism is the methodical constructivism of the Erlangen School (cf. also the methodical culturalism of the Marburg School).
The Berlin Circle had much in common with the Vienna Circle, but the philosophies of the circles differed on a few subjects, such as probability and conventionalism. Reichenbach insisted on calling his philosophy logical empiricism, to distinguish it from the logical positivism of the Vienna circle. Few people today make the distinction, and the words are often used interchangeably.
Dworkin nonetheless has argued that this justification fails to fit with facts as there are many occasions wherein clear applicable legal rules are absent. It follows that, as he maintained, conventionalism can provide no valid ground for state coercion. Dworkin himself favored law as integrity as the best justification of state coercion.