Synonyms for emotivism or Related words with emotivism

intuitionism              emergentism              contextualism              panpsychism              nominalism              internalism              nominalist              logicism              fallibilism              subjectivism              externalism              solipsism              foundationalism              pandeism              dialetheism              cognitivism              expressivism              behaviorism              holism              fideism              internalist              presentism              epistemology              perspectivism              neopragmatism              prescriptivism              heideggerian              ultrafinitism              phenomenalism              organicism              instrumentalism              foundationalist              occasionalism              empiricist              scientism              fictionalism              praxeology              compatibilism              behaviourism              mereology              empiricism              metaphilosophy              boasian              humean              personalism              relativist              interactionist              objectivism              pantheism              peircean             



Examples of "emotivism"
C. L. Stevenson also advanced an important version of emotivism.
Ayer's version of emotivism divides "the ordinary system of ethics" into four classes:
In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare.
Moore's ethical intuitionism has been seen as opening the road for noncognitive views of morality, such as emotivism.
Ethics and Language is a 1944 book by C. L. Stevenson which was influential in furthering the metaethical view of emotivism first espoused by David Hume.
Konečni recently published a theoretical article on emotion in the domain of painting and art installations and discussed emotivism in this context also.
Romance raises questions of emotivism (or in a more pejorative sense, nihilism) such as whether spiritual attraction, of the world, might not actually rise above or distinguish itself from that of the body or aesthetic sensibility.
This makes prescriptivism a universalist form of non-cognitivism. Prescriptivism stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism (such as emotivism and quasi-realism), as well as to all forms of cognitivism (including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism).
A. J. Ayer's version of emotivism is given in chapter six, "Critique of Ethics and Theology", of "Language, Truth and Logic". In that chapter, Ayer divides "the ordinary system of ethics" into four classes:
A close cousin of emotivism, developed by R. M. Hare, is called universal prescriptivism. Prescriptivists interpret ethical statements as being universal "imperatives", prescribing behavior for all to follow. According to prescriptivism,
Some early versions of expressivism arose during the early twentieth century in association with logical positivism. These early views are typically called "noncognitivist". A. J. Ayer’s emotivism is a well-known example.
Hume's theory of ethics has been influential in modern day meta-ethical theory, helping to inspire emotivism, and ethical expressivism and non-cognitivism, as well as Allan Gibbard's general theory of moral judgment and judgments of rationality.
Hare was greatly influenced by the emotivism of A. J. Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson, the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin, a certain reading of the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, utilitarianism, and Immanuel Kant.
The emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to A.J. Ayer's defense of positivism in "Language, Truth and Logic", which contains his statement of emotivism. However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself, perhaps not even in Ayer's form, and some positivists in the Vienna Circle, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views.
Konečni has written that there is ample evidence to view the majority position about the relationship between music and emotion as an aspect of the socio-culturally prevalent “emotivism,” which he distinguished from emotivism in ethics, and defined as “the propensity for excessive insertion of emotion and ‘feeling’ into both lay and scientific theories of mental life, motives, needs, and daily behavior, in matters artistic and non-artistic.” He has suggested that the proclivity for emotional and quasi-emotional excess is related to the prevalent anti-narrative social climate, which often ignores evidence and reason.
Utilitarian philosopher Richard Brandt offered several criticisms of emotivism in his 1959 book "Ethical Theory". His first is that "ethical utterances are not obviously the kind of thing the emotive theory says they are, and prima facie, at least, should be viewed as statements." He thinks that emotivism cannot explain why most people, historically speaking, have considered ethical sentences to be "fact-stating" and not just emotive. Furthermore, he argues that people who change their moral views see their prior views as mistaken, not just different, and that this does not make sense if their attitudes were all that changed:
He gave the most sophisticated defense of emotivism in the post-war period. In his papers "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" (1937) and "Persuasive Definitions" (1938), and his book "Ethics and Language" (1944), he developed a theory of emotive meaning; which he then used to provide a foundation for his theory of a persuasive definition. He furthermore advanced emotivism as a meta-ethical theory that sharply delineated between cognitive, scientific uses of language (used to state facts and to give reasons, and subject to the laws of science) and non-cognitive uses (used to state feelings and exercise influence).
He was a professor at Yale University from 1939 to 1946, but was denied tenure because of his defense of emotivism. He then taught at the University of Michigan from 1946 to 1977. He studied in England with Wittgenstein and G. E. Moore. Among his students was Joel Feinberg.
Emotivism, associated with A. J. Ayer, the Vienna Circle and C. L. Stevenson, suggests that ethical sentences are primarily emotional expressions of one's own attitudes and are intended to influence the actions of the listener. Under this view, "Killing is wrong" is translated as "Killing, boo!" or "I disapprove of killing."
G. E. Moore published his "Principia Ethica" in 1903 and argued that the attempts of ethical naturalists to translate ethical terms (like "good" and "bad") into non-ethical ones (like "pleasing" and "displeasing") committed the "naturalistic fallacy". Moore was a cognitivist, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism, particularly emotivism.