Synonyms for foundationalism or Related words with foundationalism

subjectivism              intuitionism              fallibilism              kantian              empiricism              nominalism              humean              relativism              emergentism              rationalism              essentialism              conventionalism              theism              psychologism              panpsychism              coherentism              cognitivism              nominalist              solipsism              cognitivist              foundationalist              scientism              presentism              physicalism              deism              positivism              materialist              logicism              atomism              objectivism              expressivism              positivist              contextualism              existentialism              subjectivist              aristotelianism              phenomenalism              eliminativism              holism              empiricist              dualism              hegelian              pantheism              externalism              behaviorism              essentialist              universalism              emotivism              cartesianism              trivialism             

Examples of "foundationalism"
Several alternative approaches have been developed based on foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, positivism, behaviouralism, structuralism and post-structuralism. These theories however are not widely known.
Anti-foundationalism rejects foundationalism and denies there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge.
Such foundational approaches range between foundationalism and formalism.
Classically, foundationalism had posited infallibility of basic beliefs and deductive reasoning between beliefs—a strong foundationalism. About 1975 weak foundationalism emerged. Thus recent foundationalists have variously allowed fallible basic beliefs, and inductive reasoning between them, either by enumerative induction or by inference to the best explanation. And whereas internalists require cognitive access to justificatory means, externalists find justification without such access.
The philosopher Anthony Kenny argues that the idea, "common to theists like Aquinas and Descartes and to an atheist like Russell" that "Rational belief [is] either self-evident or based directly or indirectly on what is evident" (which he termed "foundationalism" following Plantinga) is self-refuting on the basis that this idea is itself neither self-evident nor based directly or indirectly on what is evident and that the same applies to other formulations of such foundationalism. However, the self-evident impossibility of infinite regress can be offered as a justification for foundationalism. Following the identification of problems with "naive foundationalism", the term is now often used to focus on incorrigible beliefs (modern foundationalism), or basic beliefs (reformed foundationalism).
His approach is distinct from foundationalism, empiricist or otherwise, as well as from coherentism, by the following three dimensions:
Foundationalism holds that all beliefs must be justified in order to be believed. Beliefs therefore fall into two categories:
Reformed epistemology is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises from religious experience, rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be "prima facie" justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.
In addition, as a form of foundationalism, PC is open to some of the common objections to that doctrine.
Sher has pursued research into logical positivism and logical foundationalism. She has argued that strict-ordering Foundationalism, in the vein of Rudolf Carnap, is untenable, supporting Quine's argument from "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". She has, however, resisted the mainstream move toward all-or-nothing and semantic holism. The former view she considers unexplanatory, and the latter she considers untenable (see: Jerry Fodor).
While Rorty shares Dewey’s commitment to debunk epistemological foundationalism, he (Rorty) believes that the notion of language is better suited to achieve this goal, than the notion of immediate, non-discursive experience preferred by Dewey. Rorty further says that Dewey’s theory itself collapses into a version of foundationalism, where immediate, non-discursive experience serves as evidence for particular knowledge claims.
Descartes built his ideas from scratch. He relates this to architecture, the top soil is taken away to create a new building or structure. Descartes calls his doubt the soil and new knowledge the buildings. To Descartes, Aristotle’s foundationalism is incomplete and his method of doubt enhances foundationalism.
Identifying the alternatives as either circular reasoning or infinite regress, and thus exhibiting the regress problem, Aristotle made foundationalism his own clear choice, positing basic beliefs underpinning others.
Presuppositional apologetics could be seen as being more closely allied with foundationalism than fideism, though it has sometimes been critical of both.
Edward Said condemned radical anti-foundationalism for excessive cultural relativism and overdependence on the linguistic turn at the expense of human realities.
Plantinga's reformed epistemology includes two arguments against classical foundationalism. The first grew out of his earlier argument in "God and Other Minds" (1967). In that work Plantinga argued that if our belief in other minds is rational without propositional or physical evidence, then belief in God is also rational. In his 1993 works, Plantinga argued that according to classical foundationalism most of us are irrational for having many beliefs we cannot justify, but which foundationalism does not accept as properly basic. Plantinga's second argument against classical foundationalism is that it is self-referentially incoherent. It fails the test of its own rules, which require that it be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses.
Haack argues that foundationalism and coherentism don't exhaust the field, and that an intermediate theory is more plausible than either. It is possible to include the relevance of experience for the justification of empirical beliefs, as experientialist foundationalism does but coherentism does not, and at the same time, instead of requiring a privileged class of basic beliefs, to allow for pervasive mutual dependence among beliefs, as coherentism does but foundationalism does not. These are the key ideas of foundherentism. Precursors of Haack's view include Bertrand Russell's epistemology, in which both empirical foundations and coherence are components of justification.
Foundationalism holds basic beliefs exist, which are justified without reference to other beliefs, and that nonbasic beliefs must ultimately be justified by basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must be infallible if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that only deductive reasoning can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another. Laurence BonJour has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified. Mental states and immediate experience are often taken as good candidates for basic beliefs because it is argued that beliefs about these do not need further support to be justified.
Religious epistemologists have formulated and defended reasons for the rationality of accepting belief in God without the support of an argument. Some religious epistemologists hold that belief in God is more analogous to belief in a person than belief in a scientific hypothesis. Human relations demand trust and commitment. If belief in God is more like belief in other persons, then the trust that is appropriate to persons will be appropriate to God. American psychologist and philosopher William James offers a similar argument in his lecture "The Will to Believe." Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowledge. Foundationalism holds that all knowledge and justified belief are ultimately based upon what are called properly basic beliefs. This position is intended to resolve the infinite regress problem in epistemology. According to foundationalism, a belief is epistemically justified only if it is justified by properly basic beliefs. One of the significant developments in foundationalism is the rise of reformed epistemology.
D. Z. Phillips (1934-2006) takes this further and says that the argument of the reformed epistemologists goes further and challenges a view he dubs "foundationalism":