Synonyms for foundationalist or Related words with foundationalist

psychologism              foundationalism              humean              materialist              fallibilism              emergentism              expressivism              empiricist              subjectivism              physicalist              essentialist              subjectivist              nominalist              intuitionism              intellectualist              logicism              positivist              dualist              cognitivism              internalist              kantian              scientism              organicism              panpsychism              relativist              hegelian              externalist              essentialism              cognitivist              deontological              occasionalism              objectivism              marxian              formalist              contractarian              rationalistic              nominalism              heideggerian              leibnizian              teleological              reductionist              reductionistic              gradualist              emotivism              conventionalism              positivistic              racialist              coherentism              antiscience              vitalist             

Examples of "foundationalist"
Radical postmodernism is an example of a postpositivist yet anti-foundationalist paradigm of international relations.
Wilfrid Sellars argued against foundationalist justification in epistemology and was therefore also highly influential to the neopragmatists especially Rorty.
Steve Smith refers to hermeneutics as the principal way of grounding a foundationalist yet postpositivist theory of international relations.
Shusterman believes that the philosophical value of experience can and should be reaffirmed in an anti-foundationalist form.
Anti-foundationalism (also called nonfoundationalism) is, as the name implies, a term applied to any philosophy which rejects a foundationalist approach, i.e. an anti-foundationalist is one who does not believe that there is some fundamental belief or principle which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge.
Butler responds to Benhabib by arguing that her use of postmodernism is an expression of a wider paranoia over anti-foundationalist philosophy, in particular, poststructuralism.
Plantinga takes his counter-argument further, asking how the great pumpkin objector "knows" that such criteria are the only criteria. The objector certainly seems to hold it as 'basic' that the classical foundationalist criteria are all that is available. Yet, such a claim is neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. This rebuts the Great Pumpkin objection by demonstrating the classical foundationalist position to be internally incoherent, propounding an epistemic position which it itself does not follow.
His first book, "Projects and Values", argues for a foundationalist virtue ethic, against the background of a structured approach to the cultural relativity of value-concepts and a conception of the human subject that is inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
In political theory, weak ontology describes a pragmatic approach that seeks to avoid foundationalist commitments. The term was first used in this context by Stephen K. White, professor of politics at the University of Virginia.
Recently, White's research has focused upon the concept of weak ontology, which he uses to describe a non-foundationalist approach to normative affirmation extrapolated from the works of George Kateb, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler, and William E. Connolly.
In "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (1979), Rorty argues that the central problems of modern epistemology depend upon a picture of the mind as trying to faithfully represent (or "mirror") a mind-independent, external reality. If we give up this metaphor, then the entire enterprise of foundationalist epistemology is misguided. A foundationalist believes that in order to avoid the regress inherent in claiming that all beliefs are justified by other beliefs, some beliefs must be self-justifying and form the foundations to all knowledge.
After re-working the foundations of classical geometry, Hilbert could have extrapolated to the rest of mathematics. His approach differed, however, from the later 'foundationalist' Russell-Whitehead or 'encyclopedist' Nicolas Bourbaki, and from his contemporary Giuseppe Peano. The mathematical community as a whole could enlist in problems, which he had identified as crucial aspects of the areas of mathematics he took to be key.
Prichard, along with other intuitionists, adopts a foundationalist approach to morality. Foundationalism is a theory of epistemology which states that there are certain fundamental principles which are the basis for all other knowledge. In the case of ethics, foundationalists hold that certain fundamental moral rules are their own justification. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explains:
Descartes, the most famed foundationalist, discovered a foundation in the fact of his own existence and in the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason, whereas Locke found a foundation in experience. Differing foundations may reflect differing epistemological emphases—empiricists emphasizing "experience", rationalists emphasizing "reason"—but may blend both.
Stone exacts her revenge more than a decade later, not by waging an anti-feminist counterattack on Raymond, but by undermining the foundationalist assumptions that support Raymond's narrower concept of womanhood, and by claiming a speaking position for transsexuals that cannot be automatically dismissed as damaged, deluded, second-rate, or somehow inherently compromised.
Ferrara's work revolves around the formulation of an authenticity- and judgment-based account of normative validity, which by way of incorporating a post-metaphysically reconstructed version of the normativity of Kant's "reflective judgment", could be immune to anti-foundationalist objections and yet represent a viable alternative to the formalism of standard proceduralist accounts of normative validity.
Foundationalist revision operators working on non-deductively closed belief bases typically select some subsets of formula_23 that are consistent with formula_24, combined them in some way, and then conjoined them with formula_24. The following are two non-deductively closed base revision operators.
Watson and Higgott argue that practitioners of this approach are gradually increasing in number. They note the prevalence of NPE not only among "Third World economic nationalists and academic critics of the neo-liberal policy agenda who find little comfort in the turn instead to anti-foundationalist theories associated with postmodernism", but also among many "mainstream" economists who have become disillusioned with neoclassical theory. In this second category they list Dani Rodrik (1998), Paul Krugman (1999) and Joseph Stiglitz (2002).
In their controversial analysis of the contemporary western society, "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (1944, revised 1947), Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer developed a wider, and more pessimistic concept of enlightenment. In their analysis, enlightenment had its dark side: while trying to abolish superstition and myths by 'foundationalist' philosophy, it ignored its own 'mythical' basis. Its strivings towards totality and certainty led to an increasing instrumentalization of reason.
BonJour is best known for his contributions to epistemology. Initially defending coherentism in his anti-foundationalist critique "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge", BonJour has since moved to defend Cartesian foundationalism in such works as "Epistemology" and "In Defense of Pure Reason". The latter book is a sustained defense of "a priori" justification, strongly criticizing empiricists and pragmatists who dismiss it (such as W. V. O. Quine and Richard Rorty).