gmip - Synonyms for gmip | Synonyms Of gmip

Examples of "gmip"
AMPH; ARHGAP17; BIN1; BIN2; BIN3; DNMBP; GMIP; RICH2; SH3BP1;
FAM13A1; FKSG42; GMIP; GRLF1; HMHA1; INPP5B; KIAA1688; LOC553158;
Although its headquarters are unknown, many of the operations of the GMIP suggest that it is rural-based. The Thai military have linked the GMIP to attacks on convoys and policemen in roads crossing rural districts.
The Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (; GMIP) is an Islamic insurgent movement having carried out violent actions as part of the protracted insurgency in Southern Thailand.
On 26 July 2009 Abu Yasir Fikri, President of PULO, and the "emir" of the Group of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Me Kuteh, agreed to join forces. Abu Yasir Fikri was allowed to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. The agreement included a section in which they agreed to form a unified military force, the Patani Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA would be commanded by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO).
According to Thai military authorities Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia is behind the revival of Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), groups that have now more hard-line Islamic political goals.
On 26 July 2009, the president of PULO and the Emir of the Movement of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Cikgume Kuteh, made an official agreement to join forces. The agreement included giving a mandate to president of PULO to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. The agreement also included a section in which the movements agreed to unite in one military force, the Patani Liberation Army, to be led by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO).
Like the BRN-C, the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) is a group that experienced a revival after 2001 and has currently more hard-line Islamic political goals, to the detriment of its former nationalist cause. Its members are now believed to have sympathies with Al Qaeda and with the establishment of the transnational Islamic Caliphate.
The attacks have been regarded by most major news outlets as part of the broader South Thailand insurgency. While no terrorist organisation took responsibility for the bombings, the most likely culprit is the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) separatist movement, which is a splinter group of the Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani.
Currently the most active insurgent movements are the BRN-Coordinate, its alleged armed wing the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), and the GMIP. PULO, the doyen of the Patani insurgent groups and formerly the most respected secessionist movement in the region, has been largely inactive in recent years.
GMIP is hostile to the practices of moderate Malay Muslims, accusing them of being un-Islamic. It is one of the most extreme terrorist groups currently operating in Southern Thailand. A shadowy leader named 'Jehkumir Kuteh' or 'Abdul Rahman Ahmad', among other names, was assumed at a certain point to lead the group, and Thailand's prime minister demanded from Malaysia his extradition in January 2005, but the Malaysian government refused.
Originally, in the 1990 decade GMIP had the establishment of a local Islamic state in Pattani as its main agenda. However, according to Thai military authorities, this group and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) were revived after 2001 by the Trengganu-based Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and have currently more hard-line Islamic political goals, to the detriment of their former nationalist cause. Its members are now believed to have sympathies with Al Qaeda and with the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.
It is assumed that the South Thailand insurgency carried out the attacks. While no terrorist organisation took responsibility for the bombings, General Thammarak Isarangkura na Ayudhaya indicated that Thai authorities had expected bomb attacks in Hat Yai sometime between 16 and 20 September to mark the first anniversary of the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) separatist movement, which is a splinter group of the Gerakan Mujahidin Patani.
Unlike previous Islamic insurgent groups of the region, the characteristic of this outfit in its new avatar is that it attacks forcefully and does not claim responsibility, and also that it keeps its leadership shrouded in secrecy. GMIP was accused by the Thai authorities as the main instigator of the series of bombings, drive-by shootings and machete attacks in Southern Thailand that began in January 2004.
They are currently the political representatives by popular consent of GMIP and active military fractions of BRN, RKK and other separatist groups. The "four star" is becoming increasingly powerful steadily gaining support and loyalty from separatist from different groups forcing different fractions to join their ranks. It is believed the group may have enough influence and trust to be able to enforce agreements with the Thai government and end violence against the military and militia from different separatist groups, if negotiations continue to be held between them.
A resurgence in violence by Pattani guerrilla groups began after 2001. While the region's traditional separatist insurgents had flags, leaders, claimed responsibility for the attacks, and made communiques, the new groups attacked more viciously and kept silent. This new development disoriented and confused the Thai authorities, who kept groping in the dark as the identity of the new insurgents in the conflict remained a mystery. Thailand held relatively free elections in February 2005, but no secessionist candidates contested the results in the south. In July the same year, the chairman of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee admitted, "The attacks look like they are well-organised, but we do not know what group of people is behind them." Despite of the shroud of anonymity and the absence of concrete demands, revived groups, such as the GMIP, and particularly the BRN-Coordinate and its alleged armed wing, the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), have been identified as leading the new insurgency.