Synonyms for intuitionism or Related words with intuitionism

nominalism              panpsychism              conventionalism              subjectivism              logicism              emergentism              nominalist              foundationalism              fallibilism              psychologism              holism              cognitivism              scientism              empiricism              solipsism              emotivism              phenomenalism              contextualism              leibnizian              spinozism              empiricist              kantian              mereology              intuitionist              presentism              vitalism              fideism              aristotelian              metatheory              monist              atomism              humean              expressivism              gadamer              positivist              internalism              teleology              carnap              physicalism              praxeology              feyerabend              pantheism              compatibilism              theism              interpretivism              foundationalist              sophistical              objectivism              externalist              physicalist             



Examples of "intuitionism"
Traditionally, intuitionism was often understood as having several other commitments:
Constructivism is often identified with intuitionism, although intuitionism is only one constructivist program. Intuitionism maintains that the foundations of mathematics lie in the individual mathematician's intuition, thereby making mathematics into an intrinsically subjective activity. Other forms of constructivism are not based on this viewpoint of intuition, and are compatible with an objective viewpoint on mathematics.
Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics). At minimum, ethical intuitionism is the thesis that our intuitive awareness of value, or intuitive knowledge of evaluative facts, forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge.
Sufficiently broadly defined, ethical intuitionism can be taken to encompass cognitivist forms of moral sense theory. It is usually furthermore taken as essential to ethical intuitionism that there be self-evident or "a priori" moral knowledge; this counts against considering moral sense theory to be a species of intuitionism. (see the Rational intuition versus moral sense section of this article for further discussion).
Ethical Intuitionism is a 2005 book (hardcover release: 2005, paperback release: 2008) by University of Colorado philosophy professor Michael Huemer defending ethical intuitionism. The book expands on Huemer's early writing defending moral realism.
1922 — William Ernest Hocking — "Naturalism and the Belief in Purpose"; "Intuitionism and Idealism"; "Realism and Mysticism"
Some recent work suggests the view may be enjoying a resurgence of interest in academic philosophy. Robert Audi is one of the main supporters of ethical intuitionism in our days. His 2005 book, "The Good in the Right", claims to update and strengthen Rossian intuitionism and to develop the epistemology of ethics. Michael Huemer's book "Ethical Intuitionism" (2005) also provides a recent defense of the view. Furthermore, authors writing on normative ethics often accept "methodological intuitionism" as they present allegedly obvious or intuitive examples or thought experiments as support for their theories.
Kronecker's finitism made him a forerunner of intuitionism in foundations of mathematics.
Secondly, sometimes the term "ethical intuitionism" is associated with a pluralistic, deontological position in normative ethics, a position defended by most ethical intuitionists, with Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore being notable exceptions. However, as is customary in contemporary philosophy, the term "ethical intuitionism" will be used in this article to refer to the general position that there are basic (non-inferential) moral beliefs. Thus, this usage encompasses both empiricist and rationalist accounts of non-inferential moral knowledge. While the empiricist version of ethical intuitionism is standardly called "moral sense theory" (or sometimes "sentimentalism"), there is no standard name for the rationalist version. In this article, the rationalist version of ethical intuitionism will simply be called "rationalist ethical intuitionism".
Moore's ethical intuitionism has been seen as opening the road for noncognitive views of morality, such as emotivism.
Among the different formulations of intuitionism, there are several different positions on the meaning and reality of infinity.
Huemer's book Ethical Intuitionism was reviewed in "Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews", "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research" and "Mind."
At the beginning of the 20th century, three schools of philosophy of mathematics opposed each other: Formalism, Intuitionism and Logicism.
Some use the term "ethical intuitionism" in moral philosophy to refer to the general position that we have some non-inferential moral knowledge (that is, basic moral knowledge that is not inferred from or based on any proposition). On this definition, moral sense theory is a form of ethical intuitionism.
Moral rationalism is similar to the rationalist version of ethical intuitionism; however, they are distinct views. Moral rationalism is neutral on whether basic moral beliefs are known via inference or not. A moral rationalist who believes that some moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially is a rationalist ethical intuitionist. So, rationalist ethical intuitionism implies moral rationalism, but the reverse does not hold.
He claims that two methods—intuitionism and utilitarianism—can be fully harmonized. Though most of the moral principles intuitionists often claim are “self-evident” are not actually so, there are a handful of genuinely clear and indubitable moral axioms. These, Sidgwick claims, turn out to be fully compatible with utilitarianism, and in fact are necessary to provide a rational basis for utilitarian theory. Moreover, Sidgwick argues, intuitionism in its most defensible form is saturated with latent utilitarian presuppositions. Thus, contrary to what most ethicists have believed, there is no fundamental clash between intuitionism and utilitarianism.
In the 19th century, ethical intuitionism was considered by most British philosophers to be a philosophical rival of utilitarianism, until Henry Sidgwick showed there to be several logically distinct theories, both normative and epistemological, sharing the same label. Sidgwick would furthermore argue that utilitarianism could be justified on the basis of a rational intuitionist epistemology. Inspired by this, 20th century philosopher C.D. Broad would coin the term "deontological ethics" to refer to the normative doctrines associated with intuitionism, leaving the phrase "ethical intuitionism" free to refer to the epistemological doctrines.
In a foundational controversy in twentieth-century mathematics, L. E. J. Brouwer, a supporter of intuitionism, opposed David Hilbert, the founder of formalism.
Opposing the completely deductive character of logicism, intuitionism emphasizes the construction of ideas in the mind. Here is an intuitionist definition:
Znaniecki was critical of a number of then-prevalent philosophical viewpoints: intellectualism, idealism realism naturalism and rationalism. He was also critical of irrationalism and intuitionism.