Synonyms for panpsychism or Related words with panpsychism

emergentism              intuitionism              subjectivism              nominalism              pantheism              phenomenalism              nominalist              compatibilism              humean              solipsism              monism              occasionalism              vitalism              theism              cognitivism              foundationalism              fallibilism              hylomorphism              physicalism              logicism              organicism              presentism              teleology              perspectivism              externalism              emotivism              dualism              atomism              fideism              leibnizian              holism              hylozoism              monistic              dualist              scientism              spinozism              monist              conventionalism              supernaturalism              objectivism              panentheism              kantian              expressivism              contextualism              essentialism              theistic              empiricist              vitalist              materialist              prescriptivism             



Examples of "panpsychism"
Panpsychism can be understood as related to a number of other metaphysical positions.
Panpsychism is one of the oldest philosophical theories, and has been ascribed to philosophers like Thales, Parmenides, Plato, Averroes, Spinoza, Leibniz and William James. Panpsychism can also be seen in ancient philosophies such as Stoicism, Taoism, Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism. During the 19th century, panpsychism was the default theory in philosophy of mind, but it saw a decline during the middle years of the 20th century with the rise of logical positivism. The recent interest in the hard problem of consciousness has revived interest in panpsychism.
No form of panpsychism attributes full, human-style consciousness to the fundamental constituents of the universe, therefore all versions need a certain amount of emergence—that is, "weak emergence", in which more sophisticated versions of basic properties emerge at a higher level. No version of panpsychism requires "strong emergence", in which high-level properties do not have any low-level precursors or basis, and instead emerge "from nothing". Indeed, avoidance of strong emergentism is one of the motivations for panpsychism, while strong emergentism, based on the reality of time, is the major argument against panpsychism.
Thomas Aquinas specifically attacked the doctrine of monopsychism and panpsychism in his book "De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas".
A. N. Whitehead advocated a sophisticated form of panpsychism that has been called by David Ray Griffin "panexperientialism".
In his book titled "Mortal Questions", Thomas Nagel defines panpsychism as, "the view that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties," effectively claiming the panpsychist thesis to be a type of property dualism. Nagel argues that panpsychism follows from four premises:
The term "Averroist" was coined by Thomas Aquinas in the restricted sense of monopsychism and panpsychism in his book "De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas".
One criticism of panpsychism is the simple lack of evidence that the physical entities have any mental attributes. John Searle states that panpsychism is an "absurd view" and that thermostats lack "enough structure even to be a remote candidate for consciousness" (Searle, 1997, p. 48).
Reductive physicalism, a form of monism, is normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism, if held to be distinct from physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties are attributed to physical matter, which is the only basic substance.
In "The Origin of Consciousness" (1918), Strong advocated a form of panpsychism. The book expanded on William Kingdon Clifford's mind-stuff theory. Philosopher David Skrbina has noted that "Strong stands out as one of the more consistent and open advocates of panpsychism in the first part of the century."
In this way, though, subjectivism morphs into a related doctrine, panpsychism, the belief that every objective entity (or event) has an inward or subjective aspect.
In his 2002 "Consciousness and its Place in Nature," Chalmers carefully considers neutral monism and panpsychism, variants of what he calls "Type-F Monism". He admits that:
In the philosophy of mind, panpsychism is one possible solution to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. The doctrine has also been applied in the field of environmental philosophy through the work of Australian philosopher Freya Mathews. David Chalmers has provided a sympathetic account of it in "The Conscious Mind" (1996). In addition, neuroscientist Christof Koch has proposed a "scientifically refined version" of panpsychism.
Whitehead is not an idealist in the strict sense. Whitehead's thought may be regarded as related to the idea of panpsychism (also known as panexperientialism, because of Whitehead's emphasis on experience).
Panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since
Expressing strong sympathy for panpsychism, Harman proposes a new philosophical discipline called "speculative psychology" dedicated to investigating the "cosmic layers of psyche" and "ferreting out the specific psychic reality of earthworms, dust, armies, chalk, and stone." Harman does not, however, unreservedly endorse an all-encompassing panpsychism and instead proposes a sort of polypsychism that nonetheless must "balloon beyond all previous limits, but without quite extending to all entities". He continues by stating that "perceiving" and "non-perceiving" are not different kinds of objects, but can be found in the same entity at different times: "The important point is that objects do not perceive insofar as they exist, as panpsychism proclaims. Instead they perceive insofar as they relate."
Kauffman's recent work is posted on Physics ArXiv, including "Beyond the Stalemate: Mind/Body, Quantum Mechanics, Free Will, Possible Panpsychism, Possible Solution to the Quantum Enigma" (October 2014) and "Quantum Criticality at the Origin of Life" (February 2015).
In philosophy, panpsychism is the view that consciousness, mind or soul (psyche) is a universal and primordial feature of all things. Panpsychists see themselves as minds in a world of mind.
Our only intelligible notion of an object "in itself" is that it should be an object "for itself", and this lands us in panpsychism and a belief that our physical perceptions are effects on us of 'psychical' realities
Agar was the author of the book "A Contribution to the Theory of the Living Organism" (1943). The book was based on the system of Whitehead's philosophy of the organism and argued for a form panpsychism.