Synonyms for psychologism or Related words with psychologism

nominalism              subjectivism              nominalist              intuitionism              foundationalist              foundationalism              empiricism              materialist              positivism              empiricist              solipsism              scientism              positivists              hegelian              expressivism              positivist              atomism              aristotelian              humean              conventionalism              fallibilism              heideggerian              rationalism              kantian              organicism              cognitivism              essentialism              relativist              holism              emergentism              occasionalism              externalism              dualist              antinomies              gadamer              teleology              dialectics              leibnizian              logicism              husserlian              relativism              carnap              physicalist              casuistry              panpsychism              hegelianism              teleological              vitalism              subjectivist              epistemological             

Examples of "psychologism"
Other forms of psychologism are logical psychologism and mathematical psychologism. Logical psychologism is a position in logic (or the philosophy of logic) according to which logical laws and mathematical laws are grounded in, derived from, explained or exhausted by psychological facts (or laws). Psychologism in the philosophy of mathematics is the position that mathematical concepts and/or truths are grounded in, derived from or explained by psychological facts (or laws).
In psychologism, mathematical objects are mental objects.
Edmund Husserl was another important proponent of anti-psychologism, and this trait passed on to other phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger, whose doctoral thesis was meant to be a refutation of psychologism. They shared the argument that, because the proposition "no-p is a not-p" is not logically equivalent to "It is thought that 'no-p is a not-p'", psychologism does not logically stand. Psychologism was criticized in logic also by Charles Sanders Peirce whose fields included logic, philosophy, and experimental psychology, and generally in philosophy by Maurice Merleau-Ponty who held the chairs of philosophy and child psychology at the University of Paris.
John Stuart Mill seems to have been an advocate of a type of logical psychologism, as were many 19th-century German logicians such as Sigwart and Erdmann as well as a number of psychologists, past and present: for example, Gustave Le Bon. Psychologism was famously criticized by Frege in his "The Foundations of Arithmetic", and many of his works and essays, including his review of Husserl's "Philosophy of Arithmetic". Edmund Husserl, in the first volume of his "Logical Investigations", called "The Prolegomena of Pure Logic", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it. The "Prolegomena" is considered a more concise, fair, and thorough refutation of psychologism than the criticisms made by Frege, and also it is considered today by many as being a memorable refutation for its decisive blow to psychologism. Psychologism was also criticized by Charles Sanders Peirce and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
The word was coined by Johann Eduard Erdmann as "Psychologismus", being translated into English as "psychologism".
This confusion made by psychologism (and related disciplines such as biologism and anthropologism) can be due to three specific prejudices:
Psychologism is a philosophical position, according to which psychology plays a central role in grounding or explaining some other, non-psychological type of fact or law. The "Oxford English Dictionary" defines "psychologism" as: "The view or doctrine that a theory of psychology or ideas forms the basis of an account of metaphysics, epistemology, or meaning; (sometimes) spec. the explanation or derivation of mathematical or logical laws in terms of psychological facts." Psychologism in epistemology, the idea that its problems "can be solved satisfactorily by the psychological study of the development of mental processes", was argued in John Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1690).
Psychologism in the philosophy of mathematics is the position that mathematical concepts and/or truths are grounded in, derived from or explained by psychological facts (or laws).
The rival thesis, psychologism, is not widely held amongst logicians, but it does have some high-profile defenders, for example Dov Gabbay.
In "Psychologism and Behaviorism", Ned Block takes psychologism as the position that "whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it." This is in contrast to a behavioral view which would state that intelligence can be ascribed to a being solely via observing its behavior. This type of behavioral view is strongly associated with the Turing test.
Reacting against authors such as J. S. Mill, Christoph von Sigwart and his own former teacher Brentano, Husserl criticised their psychologism in mathematics and logic, i.e. their conception of these abstract and "a priori" sciences as having an essentially empirical foundation and a prescriptive or descriptive nature. According to psychologism, logic would not be an autonomous discipline, but a branch of psychology, either proposing a prescriptive and practical "art" of correct judgement (as Brentano and some of his more orthodox students did) or a description of the factual processes of human thought. Husserl pointed out that the failure of anti-psychologists to defeat psychologism was a result of being unable to distinguish between the foundational, theoretical side of logic, and the applied, practical side. Pure logic does not deal at all with "thoughts" or "judgings" as mental episodes but about "a priori" laws and conditions for any theory and any judgments whatsoever, conceived as propositions in themselves.
Scholars such as J. N. Mohanty, Claire Ortiz Hill, and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, among others, have argued that Husserl's so-called change from psychologism to Platonism came about independently of Frege's review.
In logic, anti-psychologism (also logical objectivism or logical realism) is a theory about the nature of logical truth, that it does not depend upon the contents of human ideas but exists independent of human ideas.
This conception of logic eventually developed into an extreme form of psychologism espoused in the nineteenth by Benno Erdmann and others. The view of historians of logic is that Kant's influence was negative.
John Stuart Mill was accused by Edmund Husserl of being an advocate of a type of logical psychologism, although this may not have been the case. So were many nineteenth-century German logicians such as Christoph von Sigwart and Erdmann himself, as well as a number of psychologists, past and present (e.g., Gustave Le Bon). Psychologism was criticized by Gottlob Frege in his "The Foundations of Arithmetic", and many of his works and essays, including his review of Husserl's "Philosophy of Arithmetic". Husserl, in the first volume of his "Logical Investigations", called "The Prolegomena of Pure Logic", criticized psychologism thoroughly and sought to distance himself from it. Frege's arguments were largely ignored, while Husserl's were widely discussed.
Another similar (to a small degree, see Psychologism and Anti-psychologism) manifestation of the law can be found in gambling, where gamblers tend to remember their wins and forget their losses, even if the latter far outnumbers the former (though depending on a particular person's environment, behaviors, customs or habits, so the opposite may also be local truth – "statistical prevalence not featured"). Mikal Aasved links it with "selective memory bias", allowing gamblers to mentally distance themselves from the consequences of their gambling by holding an inflated view of their real winnings (or losses in the opposite case).
Such criticisms did not immediately extirpate what is called "psychologism". For example, the American philosopher Josiah Royce, while acknowledging the force of Husserl's critique, remained "unable to doubt" that progress in psychology would be accompanied by progress in logic, and vice versa.
V.Ovcharenko introduced the categories of "sociological psychologism", "conceptual problematic complex", "conceptual problematic associations", "latent and contact world history", "dispersed rational sphere", "dispersed psychoanalytical sphere", "multibasisness of a person", etc. He published about 1500 articles in different countries. These include more than 700 biographies of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and psychoanalysts. He also wrote articles in Russian and foreign journals, encyclopedias and dictionaries.
He argues that the problem of such social research is that there may be a tendency towards "psychologism", which explains human behavior on the individual level without reference to the social context. This, he argues, may lead to the separation of research from theory.
Phenomenology, attempting to bracket egocentrism, appears to be more synoptic than analytic philosophy, logical atomism and logical positivism. Wilfrid Sellars (1962) used the term 'synoptic'. The Anglo-American philosophy made a synoptic, synthetic turn explicitly during the last quarter of the last century, giving birth or rebirth to absolute idealism, phenomenology, poststructuralism, psychologism, historicism, contextualism, holism, and the like.