Synonyms for solipsism or Related words with solipsism
Examples of "solipsism"
is a form of logical minimalism. Many people are intuitively unconvinced of the nonexistence of the external world from the basic arguments of
, but a solid proof of its existence is not available at present. The central assertion of
rests on the nonexistence of such a proof, and strong
(as opposed to weak
) asserts that no such proof can be made. In this sense,
is logically related to agnosticism in religion: the distinction between believing you do not know, and believing you could not have known.
To discuss consequences clearly, an alternative is required:
as opposed to what?
is opposed to all forms of realism and many forms of idealism (insofar as they claim that there is something outside the idealist's mind, which is itself another mind, or mental in nature). Realism in a minimal sense, that "there is an external universe" is most likely not observationally distinct from
. The objections to
therefore have a theoretical rather than an empirical thrust.
Denial of materialistic existence, in itself, does not constitute
syndrome feel that the world is not 'real' in the sense of being external to their own minds. The syndrome is characterized by feelings of loneliness, detachment and indifference to the outside world.
syndrome is not currently recognized as a psychiatric disorder by the American Psychiatric Association, though it shares similarities with depersonalization disorder, which is recognized.
syndrome is distinct from
, which is not a psychological state but rather a philosophical position, namely that nothing exists or can be known to exist outside of one's own mind; advocates of this philosophy do not necessarily suffer from
syndrome, and sufferers do not necessarily subscribe to
as a school of intellectual thought.
syndrome is a dissociative mental state. It is only incidentally related to philosophical
. The lack of ability to prove the existence of other minds does not, in itself, cause the psychiatric condition of detachment from reality.
The concept of the Self in the philosophy of Advaita, could be interpreted as
. However, the transhuman, theological implications of the Self in Advaita protect it from true
as is found in the west. Similarly, the Vedantic text Yogavasistha, escapes charge of
because the real "I" is thought to be nothing but the absolute whole looked at through a particular unique point of interest.
is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from Latin "solus" (alone) and "ipse" (self).
as an epistemological position holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a metaphysical position,
goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist. As such it is the only epistemological position that, by its own postulate, is both irrefutable and yet indefensible in the same manner. Although the number of individuals sincerely espousing
has been small, it is not uncommon for one philosopher to accuse another's arguments of entailing
as an unwanted consequence, in a kind of reductio ad absurdum. In the history of philosophy,
has served as a skeptical hypothesis.
(; ) is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position,
holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind. As a metaphysical position,
goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist.
Schubert-Soldern held teaching posts at Leipzig and Görz. He defended a philosophy of epistemological
In teachings of Ramana Maharshi there are two cues on
There are varying degrees of
that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism:
is a variety of
. Based on a philosophy of subjective idealism, metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence. There are weaker versions of metaphysical
, such as Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other people are conscious but their experiences are simply not "present".
In epistemology and the philosophy of mind, methodological
has at least two distinct definitions:
Friedan's chapter on "The Sexual
of Sigmund Freud" was inspired by Simone de Beauvoir's "The Second Sex".
On the face of it, a "statement" of
is — at least performatively — self-defeating, because a statement assumes another person to whom the statement is made. (That is to say, an unexpressed private belief in
is not self-refuting). This, of course, assumes the solipsist would not communicate with a hallucination, even if just for self-amusement.
There are weaker versions of metaphysical
, such as Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other persons are conscious but their experiences are simply not "present". Similarly, J. J. Valberg develops a concept of one's personal horizon and discusses how it is in a sense "the" (preeminent) horizon, stating that "we are all solipsists" in his sense of
is an agnostic variant of
. It exists in opposition to the strict epistemological requirements for "Knowledge" ("e.g." the requirement that knowledge must be certain). It still entertains the points that any induction is fallible and that we may be brains in vats. Methodological
sometimes goes even further to say that even what we perceive as the brain is actually part of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Only the existence of thoughts is known for certain.
was first recorded by the Greek presocratic sophist, Gorgias (c. 483–375 BC) who is quoted by the Roman skeptic Sextus Empiricus as having stated:
Egocentric presentism is a weak form of
introduced by Caspar Hare in which other persons can be conscious, but their experiences are simply not "present".
Rae Helen Langton, in "Sexual
: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification", proposed three more properties to be added to Nussbaum's list:
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