Synonyms for trivialism or Related words with trivialism
Examples of "trivialism"
Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and
" lists eight types of anti-
) through the use of possible worlds:
In symbolic logic,
may be expressed as the following:
The consensus among the majority of philosophers is descriptively a denial of
, termed as non-
. This is due to it being unable to produce a sound argument through the principle of explosion and it being considered an absurdity (reductio ad absurdum).
In classical logic,
is in direct violation of Aristotle's law of noncontradiction. In philosophy,
may be considered by some to be the complete opposite of skepticism. Paraconsistent logics may use "the law of non-triviality" to abstain from
in logical practices that involve true contradictions.
Aristotle's law of noncontradiction and other arguments are considered to be against
. Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and
" has interpreted Aristotle's "Metaphysics Book IV" as such: "...A family of arguments between 1008a26 and 1007b12 of the form 'If
is right, then X is the case, but if X is the case then all things are one. But it is impossible that all things are one, so
is impossible.'(...)these Aristotelian considerations are the seeds of virtually all subsequent suspicions against
has to be rejected because it identifies what should not be identified, and is undesirable from a logical point of view because it identifies what is not identical, namely, truth and falsehood."
It is implicitly claimed by Graham Priest, a professor of philosophy, that a position for
is unsubstantial: "...a substantial case can be made for [dialetheism]; belief in [
], though, would appear to be grounds for certifiable insanity."
Paul Kabay has argued for
in "On the Plenitude of Truth" from the following:
There are theoretical arguments for
argued from the position of a devil's advocate:
A claim of
may always apply its fundamental truth, otherwise known as a truth predicate:
Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and
" lists four types of
through the concept of possible worlds, with a "world" being a possibility and "the actual world" being reality. It is theorized a trivialist simply designates a value to all propositions in equivalence to seeing all propositions and their negations as true. This taxonomy is used to demonstrate the different strengths and plausibility of
in this context:
Paul Kabay, an Australian philosopher, in his book "A Defense of
" has argued that various philosophers in history have held views resembling
, although he stops short of calling them trivialists. He mentions various pre-Socratic Greek philosophers as philosophers holding views resembling
. He mentions that Aristotle in his book "Metaphysics" appears to suggest that Heraclitus and Anaxagoras advocated
. He quotes Anaxagoras as saying that all things are one. Kabay also suggests Heraclitus' ideas are similar to
because Heraclitus believed in a union of opposites, shown in such quotes as "the way up and down is the same". Kabay also mentions a fifteen century Roman Catholic cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, stating that what Cusa wrote in "De Docta Ignorantia" is interpreted as stating that God contained every fact, which Kabay argues would result in
, but Kabay admits that mainstream Cusa scholars would not agree with interpreting Cusa as a trivialist. Kabay also mentions Spinoza as a philosopher whose views resemble
. Kabay argues Spinoza was a trivialist because Spinoza believed everything was made of one substance which had infinite attributes. Kabay also mentions Hegel as a philosophers whose views resemble
, quoting Hegel as stating in "The Science of Logic" "everything is inherently contradictory."
He has coined his rejection of
"the law of non-triviality" as a replacement for the law of non-contradiction in paraconsistent logic and dialetheism.
Theoretical arguments and anecdotes have been offered for
to contrast it with theories such as modal realism (possibilism), dialetheism and paraconsistent logics.
The liar's paradox, Curry's paradox alongside the principle of explosion all can be asserted as valid and not required to be resolved and used to defend
The above would be read as a "proposition if and only if a true proposition," meaning that all propositions are believed to be inherently proven as true. Without consistent use of this concept, a claim of advocating
may not be seen as genuine and complete
; as to claim a proposition is true but deny it as probably true may be considered inconsistent with the assumed theory.
Above, possibilism (modal realism; related to possible worlds) is the barely accepted theory that every proposition is possible. With this assumed to be true,
can be assumed to be true as well according to Kabay.
() is the logical theory that all statements (also known as propositions) are true and that all contradictions of the form "p and not p" (e.g. the ball is red and not red) are true. In accordance to this, a trivialist is a person who believes everything is true.
In this case—and according to independent claims by Graham Priest—
is considered the complete opposite of skepticism. However, insofar as the trivialist affirms all states of affairs as universally true, the Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies the truth (or falsity) of such affairs.
Jody Azzouni is a purported advocate of
in his article "The Strengthened Liar" by claiming that natural language is trivial and inconsistent through the existence of the liar paradox ("This sentence is false"), and claiming that natural language has developed without central direction. It is heavily implied by Azzouni that every sentence in any natural language is true.
Graham Priest and other logicians, including J.C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb have proposed that the liar sentence should be considered to be both true and false, a point of view known as dialetheism. Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism raises its own problems. Chief among these is that since dialetheism recognizes the liar paradox, an intrinsic contradiction, as being true, it must discard the long-recognized principle of explosion, which asserts that any proposition can be deduced from a contradiction, unless the dialetheist is willing to accept
- the view that "all" propositions are true. Since
is an intuitively false view, dialetheists nearly always reject the explosion principle. Logics that reject it are called "paraconsistent".
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