Synonyms for trivialism or Related words with trivialism

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Examples of "trivialism"
Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and Trivialism" lists eight types of anti-trivialism (or non-trivialism) through the use of possible worlds:
In symbolic logic, trivialism may be expressed as the following:
The consensus among the majority of philosophers is descriptively a denial of trivialism, termed as non-trivialism or anti-trivialism. This is due to it being unable to produce a sound argument through the principle of explosion and it being considered an absurdity (reductio ad absurdum).
In classical logic, trivialism is in direct violation of Aristotle's law of noncontradiction. In philosophy, trivialism may be considered by some to be the complete opposite of skepticism. Paraconsistent logics may use "the law of non-triviality" to abstain from trivialism in logical practices that involve true contradictions.
Aristotle's law of noncontradiction and other arguments are considered to be against trivialism. Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and Trivialism" has interpreted Aristotle's "Metaphysics Book IV" as such: "...A family of arguments between 1008a26 and 1007b12 of the form 'If trivialism is right, then X is the case, but if X is the case then all things are one. But it is impossible that all things are one, so trivialism is impossible.'(...)these Aristotelian considerations are the seeds of virtually all subsequent suspicions against trivialism: Trivialism has to be rejected because it identifies what should not be identified, and is undesirable from a logical point of view because it identifies what is not identical, namely, truth and falsehood."
It is implicitly claimed by Graham Priest, a professor of philosophy, that a position for trivialism is unsubstantial: "...a substantial case can be made for [dialetheism]; belief in [trivialism], though, would appear to be grounds for certifiable insanity."
Paul Kabay has argued for trivialism in "On the Plenitude of Truth" from the following:
There are theoretical arguments for trivialism argued from the position of a devil's advocate:
A claim of trivialism may always apply its fundamental truth, otherwise known as a truth predicate:
Luis Estrada-González in "Models of Possiblism and Trivialism" lists four types of trivialism through the concept of possible worlds, with a "world" being a possibility and "the actual world" being reality. It is theorized a trivialist simply designates a value to all propositions in equivalence to seeing all propositions and their negations as true. This taxonomy is used to demonstrate the different strengths and plausibility of trivialism in this context:
Paul Kabay, an Australian philosopher, in his book "A Defense of Trivialism" has argued that various philosophers in history have held views resembling trivialism, although he stops short of calling them trivialists. He mentions various pre-Socratic Greek philosophers as philosophers holding views resembling trivialism. He mentions that Aristotle in his book "Metaphysics" appears to suggest that Heraclitus and Anaxagoras advocated trivialism. He quotes Anaxagoras as saying that all things are one. Kabay also suggests Heraclitus' ideas are similar to trivialism because Heraclitus believed in a union of opposites, shown in such quotes as "the way up and down is the same". Kabay also mentions a fifteen century Roman Catholic cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, stating that what Cusa wrote in "De Docta Ignorantia" is interpreted as stating that God contained every fact, which Kabay argues would result in trivialism, but Kabay admits that mainstream Cusa scholars would not agree with interpreting Cusa as a trivialist. Kabay also mentions Spinoza as a philosopher whose views resemble trivialism. Kabay argues Spinoza was a trivialist because Spinoza believed everything was made of one substance which had infinite attributes. Kabay also mentions Hegel as a philosophers whose views resemble trivialism, quoting Hegel as stating in "The Science of Logic" "everything is inherently contradictory."
He has coined his rejection of trivialism "the law of non-triviality" as a replacement for the law of non-contradiction in paraconsistent logic and dialetheism.
Theoretical arguments and anecdotes have been offered for trivialism to contrast it with theories such as modal realism (possibilism), dialetheism and paraconsistent logics.
The liar's paradox, Curry's paradox alongside the principle of explosion all can be asserted as valid and not required to be resolved and used to defend trivialism.
The above would be read as a "proposition if and only if a true proposition," meaning that all propositions are believed to be inherently proven as true. Without consistent use of this concept, a claim of advocating trivialism may not be seen as genuine and complete trivialism; as to claim a proposition is true but deny it as probably true may be considered inconsistent with the assumed theory.
Above, possibilism (modal realism; related to possible worlds) is the barely accepted theory that every proposition is possible. With this assumed to be true, trivialism can be assumed to be true as well according to Kabay.
Trivialism () is the logical theory that all statements (also known as propositions) are true and that all contradictions of the form "p and not p" (e.g. the ball is red and not red) are true. In accordance to this, a trivialist is a person who believes everything is true.
In this case—and according to independent claims by Graham Priest—trivialism is considered the complete opposite of skepticism. However, insofar as the trivialist affirms all states of affairs as universally true, the Pyrrhonist neither affirms nor denies the truth (or falsity) of such affairs.
Jody Azzouni is a purported advocate of trivialism in his article "The Strengthened Liar" by claiming that natural language is trivial and inconsistent through the existence of the liar paradox ("This sentence is false"), and claiming that natural language has developed without central direction. It is heavily implied by Azzouni that every sentence in any natural language is true.
Graham Priest and other logicians, including J.C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb have proposed that the liar sentence should be considered to be both true and false, a point of view known as dialetheism. Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism raises its own problems. Chief among these is that since dialetheism recognizes the liar paradox, an intrinsic contradiction, as being true, it must discard the long-recognized principle of explosion, which asserts that any proposition can be deduced from a contradiction, unless the dialetheist is willing to accept trivialism - the view that "all" propositions are true. Since trivialism is an intuitively false view, dialetheists nearly always reject the explosion principle. Logics that reject it are called "paraconsistent".